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Must Be Reinterpreted as They Apply
to Children’s Online Contracts
Michelle A. Sargent*
The information age revolutionized the relationship between individuals and
the internet. Today, children are the targets of online advertisements that lure
them into accepting terms of service, thus entering into online agreements.
While children may feel comfortable navigating websites, they are psychologi-
cally predisposed to be unsophisticated and impulsive actors online. Children
lack the digital literacy to understand the implications of accepting website
terms of service.
Meanwhile, several states have misrepresentation-of-age statutes that prevent
children from using the infancy doctrine to disaffirm online contracts because,
in accepting the terms of service, children often represent that they are old
enough to enter into the agreement. This Note argues that the heightened
vulnerability of children online requires a reconsideration of the application of
misrepresentation-of-age statutes to children’s online contracts. To adequately
balance the policy interests in protecting children against misrepresentation
statutes’ goal of preventing unknowing adults from being taken advantage of
in the marketplace, this Note recommends that judges undertake a fact-spe-
cific, contextual inquiry of the online contract formation process.
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Introduction
“That’s the duty of the old . . . to be anxious on behalf of the young.
And the duty of the young is to scorn the anxiety of the old.”1
This maxim could reflect the relationship between adults and children at
any time throughout our history. Yet, in the modern digital era, some argue
that children are technologically savvy, sophisticated consumers whose “no-
accountability shield . . . allow[s] them to wreak havoc on the electronic
commerce system with little or no legal consequences.”2
“No-accountability shield” refers to the infancy doctrine. Under the in-
fancy doctrine, a child’s contract is voidable,3 meaning that the transaction
is per se valid, but a child can disaffirm the contract and avoid its legal
obligations.4 Children5 lack the capacity to contract6 because they lack the
ability to manifest the assent to a bargain required to incur contractual lia-
bility.7 The long-accepted rationale behind the doctrine reflects society’s
general interest in protecting children: “It was thought that the minor was
immature in both mind and experience; therefore, he should be protected
1. Philip Pullman, The Golden Compass 32 (deluxe 10th anniversary ed. 2005).
2. Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’ Incapacity to
Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 Gonz. L. Rev. 239, 241 (2007–2008); see also Larry Cun-
ningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children
and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 275, 366 (2006) (“[C]hildren’s
incapacity to contract . . . conflicts with society’s current understanding of children’s role in
the marketplace.”).
3. 5 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts
§ 9:5 (4th ed. 2009).
4. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 7 (1981). A child does not have to mani-
fest his intention to disaffirm the contract until an action is brought against him to enforce the
contract. See id. § 7 cmt. d. Moreover, a child cannot ratify the contract and make it enforcea-
ble against him until he reaches majority. See id. § 7 cmt. d., illus. 3.
5. For the purposes of the infancy doctrine, a child is anyone who has not yet reached
the age of majority, which in most American jurisdictions is eighteen. See 5 Williston &
Lord, supra note 3, § 9:3. The doctrine applies indiscriminately; it draws no distinction be-
tween young children and adolescents a day away from reaching majority. Id.; see also Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 14 (“[A] natural person has the capacity to incur only
voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before the person’s eighteenth
birthday.”).
6. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 12(2)(b).
7. See id. § 12 cmt. c.
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from his own bad judgment as well as from adults who would take advan-
tage of him.”8 In essence, children cannot properly evaluate the benefits and
risks of a contract and so are vulnerable to adults with more knowledge and
bargaining power taking advantage of them in the marketplace.9 This notion
that children are not fully capable of understanding the legal significance of
their actions, and therefore should not be held responsible according to the
same standards as adults, is mirrored elsewhere in the law.10
Judicial and legislative exceptions and defenses have gradually qualified
the infancy doctrine.11 Some of these exceptions, such as contracts for neces-
saries, contracts entered into by emancipated minors, and contracts for em-
ployment, reflect the reality that, in certain instances, children may actually
need to enter into binding contracts.12 Others, most notably the misrepre-
sentation-of-age13 and retained-benefit defenses,14 seek to provide adults
8. James L. Sivils, Jr., Comment, Contracts—Capacity of the Older Minor, 30 U. Kan.
City L. Rev. 230, 230 (1962).
9. Victoria Slade, Note, The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A Useful Ves-
tige, 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 613, 614 (2011).
10. In tort law, children are generally held accountable for their torts. This potential for
liability has created some confusion among courts as to whether a minor who can disaffirm a
contract where he has misrepresented his age may nevertheless be held liable in tort for deceit.
An analysis of this uncertainty is beyond the scope of this Note, but see 5 Williston & Lord,
supra note 3, § 9:22, for a discussion and related sources. Additionally, children may not be
found liable for intentional torts such as battery, slander, or trespass if a court finds them too
young to have formed the requisite intent. 1 Donald T. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children
§ 9:1 (rev. 2d ed. 2005). And under the tender years doctrine, courts judge children’s negligent
acts by a subjective standard—“that of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience”—
rather than the objective reasonable person standard applied to adults. Id. § 9:2. Similarly, in
criminal law, the juvenile justice system typically handles children, reflecting society’s view
that children “have diminished responsibility due to their age.” Cunningham, supra note 2, at
279. Cunningham examines the common law policy of applying a rebuttable presumption of
incapacity to children between seven and fourteen years old as well as the tension between the
“Child Savers Movement,” which viewed juvenile criminals as “psychologically troubled, mal-
leable victims,” and “law-and-order” proponents who view child-offenders as “willful, mali-
cious, and adult-like” and so deserving of adult accountability. Id. at 311–15.
11. See Slade, supra note 9, at 617–19.
12. For an analysis of these exceptions and the policies behind them, see Cheryl B.
Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine Inquiries, 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 47,
51–59 (2012).
13. A child who misrepresents that he is of the age of majority may not be allowed to
disaffirm a contract if an adult was reasonable in relying on the child’s misrepresentation. For
a discussion of this defense’s evolution, see Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the
“Infancy Law Doctrine”: From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 481, 496–97
(1994).
14. Under the retained-benefit exception, a child can only disaffirm a contract if he
makes restitution of the benefits received therefrom. See 5 Williston & Lord, supra note 3,
§ 9:14 (“[A] minor cannot take the benefit of the contract without the burden of the condi-
tions or stipulations.”). For example, if a child purchases a car and damages it in an accident,
the minor can only disaffirm the contract if he returns the damaged car or its equivalent value
to the seller. Preston & Crowther, supra note 12, at 63.
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who contract with children some protection when children try to disaffirm
their contracts.15
The myriad of exceptions and the uncertainty of their application in the
modern contract era have left the infancy doctrine on ambiguous ground,
especially with regard to the internet.16 The result has been a resurgence of
legal scholarship analyzing the doctrine’s relevance. One side argues that the
sophisticated nature of commercial transactions, the commercial value and
proportion of children who are online consumers, and the technological
competence of children warrants abandoning the infancy doctrine.17 The
other side contends that in an online environment, where the “processes of
online contracting” rely on boilerplate terms of service and where the will-
ingness of online service providers (“OSPs”) to advertise to and contract
with children “encourage[s] thoughtless and impulsive behavior,” the in-
fancy doctrine is more relevant than ever.18
In spite of this resurgence in scholarship, there has only been cursory
analysis of how online contracting affects the misrepresentation-of-age de-
fense.19 At common law, if an adult contracted with a child believing the
child to be of age—either because the child was engaged in business, misrep-
resented his age, or appeared to be of age—the child still retained the ability
to disaffirm the contract.20 Five states, however, have promulgated misrepre-
sentation-of-age statutes that move in the opposite direction.21 These stat-
utes prevent a child from disaffirming a contract if the contracting adult had
15. See Preston & Crowther, supra note 12, at 59–63.
16. See A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (E.D. Va. 2008) (extending
the retained-benefit defense to prevent high school students, who were required to submit
their papers through a website that checked submissions for plagiarism, from disaffirming an
online contract that allowed the website to archive their original works because they had re-
tained the benefit of a grade from their teacher), rev’d in part on other grounds, 562 F.3d 630
(4th Cir. 2009).
17. See Daniel, supra note 2. Daniel relies on social science studies from the 1970s in
reasoning that “adolescents possess decision-making maturity on par with adults,” id. at 253,
and he reaches the dramatic conclusion that, in protecting these adolescents from their online
contracts, society “bear[s] the burdens of being denied access to an expanding world of e-
commerce,” id. at 258.
18. Cheryl B. Preston, CyberInfants, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 225, 276–77 (2012); accord Slade,
supra note 9, at 614–16. In the context of this Note, OSPs include companies, organizations,
groups, and individuals that provide online services, including, but not limited to, e-com-
merce, e-banking, social media, news, entertainment websites, discussion forums, and
webmail.
19. See Daniel, supra note 2, at 248 (observing disagreement among states regarding
whether a minor can disaffirm a contract he induced by misrepresenting his age “irrespective
of how the misrepresentation was made”); Preston, supra note 18, at 248–52 (arguing that
OSPs fail to make reasonable efforts to ascertain the age of website users and so, applying
common law estoppel principles, they cannot use intentional misrepresentation of age as a
defense).
20. 5 Williston & Lord, supra note 3, § 9:22.
21. Iowa Code § 599.3 (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-103 (2000); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.1403 (1979); Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-3 (LexisNexis 2009); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 26.28.040 (2012).
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reason to believe that the contracting child had the capacity to contract be-
cause the child misrepresented his age.22 Commentators have generally seen
the policy underlying these statutes as protecting innocent adults who chil-
dren deceive into believing that they are contracting with other adults.23
Nevertheless, online agreements frequently contain hidden language by
which the accepting party represents that he has the capacity to contract. As
a result, children seamlessly enter into contracts in which they implicitly
misrepresent their age and thus lose the ability to void the contracts. In
doing so, children risk binding themselves to oppressive terms in the form of
forum selection clauses, warranty waivers, and dispute resolution proce-
dures; they may also inadvertently grant licenses to their intellectual prop-
erty, as well as authorize websites to track their usage and preferences so that
the websites can display targeted content. This is in addition to the obvious
potential for children to spend money and incur debts that may fall on un-
suspecting parents or damage their credit.24
This Note argues that state statutes preventing children from disaffirm-
ing contracts when they misrepresent their age should be reinterpreted with
respect to children’s online contracts. These statutes universally preceded the
advent of online transactions and therefore fail to account for the increased
vulnerability of children online. In particular, these statutes do not deal with
the problem of inadvertent misrepresentations in online contracts, and they
were promulgated without the benefits of recent studies about the effects of
online advertising and digital media on children.
Part I examines modern trends in doctrinal contract law, emphasizing
the proliferation of nonnegotiable boilerplate, the lessening of requirements
for assent, and the broadening of judicial tolerance of oppressive contract
terms. This Part argues that the world of clickwrap,25 browsewrap,26 and e-
22. See Iowa Code § 599.3 (preventing a minor from disaffirming a contract if the
minor misrepresented his majority); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-103 (same); Utah Code Ann.
§ 15-2-3 (same); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.28.040 (same); cf. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 600.1403 (preventing a minor from disaffirming a contract for goods, merchandise, chattels,
or loans of money if the minor willfully represented himself as over eighteen years old when
making the agreement).
23. Preston & Crowther, supra note 12, at 62.
24. One of the paramount concerns about children’s online activity is the issue of pri-
vacy online. An expansive analysis of privacy issues is beyond the scope of this Note, but see
infra notes 158–159 for relevant sources that may provide a gateway into the issue.
25. A clickwrap agreement is created when, in order to use a website, set up an account,
or place an order, a user browsing a website clicks on an electronic button or pop-up screen on
the website that states something such as “Yes” or “I accept,” accepting the website’s terms of
service. Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Brow-
sewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. Pub.
L. 1, 17–18 (2011). Such actions are sufficient to manifest assent that the user has read, under-
stood, and agreed to the website terms. The terms of service themselves are often hidden
beneath another layer of the website, requiring the user to click on a secondary link to actually
read the terms of service.
26. A browsewrap agreement is created merely by a user accessing (“browsing”) a web-
site. The website’s terms of service “purport, by their own terms, to become binding against
anyone using the site.” Id. at 18. The terms of service will normally mention that “using the
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commerce27 agreements increases children’s vulnerability in contracting, and
so the infancy doctrine remains an important tool to protect them. Part II
contends that children’s impaired digital literacy, especially impediments to
their online decisionmaking and text-comprehension, as well as their sus-
ceptibility to online advertisements and marketing, make children especially
vulnerable to unwittingly entering into contracts online. Part III argues that
misrepresentation-of-age statutes are, therefore, incongruent with children’s
online contracts because (1) online advertisements and hidden representa-
tions add weight to the infancy doctrine’s policy interests in protecting chil-
dren, (2) there are strong commercial incentives for websites to enter into
contracts with children, and (3) children should not be held responsible for
irrational online decisions just because adults are held accountable. Finally,
Part IV discusses the potential for legislative solutions that adapt misrepre-
sentation-of-age statutes to reflect the modern online world and asserts that,
in the short term, judicial reinterpretation of the language of misrepresenta-
tion-of-age statutes may be more effective.
I. The Infancy Doctrine in the Modern Contract Era
For the last two decades, there has been an explosion of literature dis-
cussing the modern contract era, its weakening requirements for assent, and
its tolerance for increasingly oppressive terms, as well as the legal, sociologi-
cal, and economic justifications for and criticisms of this transformation.28
Traditionally, contract formation was seen as a “meeting of the minds”—
two individuals voluntarily entering into an agreement with full knowledge
of the terms.29 In the modern era, this concept is mostly a fiction. On the
internet in particular, users frequently enter into clickwrap and browsewrap
agreements without understanding or appreciating their legal significance.
The purpose of this Part is not to critique all arguments about modern
contract theory or their application to online contracts but rather to provide
sufficient background to contextualize the vulnerability of children in this
new era. Section I.A examines the nonnegotiable nature of contracts and the
proliferation of oppressive terms as well as courts’ reinforcement of these
services indicates acceptance of all of the terms in that [terms of service].” Id. Users, therefore,
may enter into binding contracts without knowing of the agreements’ existence or their legal
consequences.
27. E-commerce agreements are contracts that are created for the purchase or sale of
goods and services on the internet. See E-commerce, Merriam–Webster, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/e-commerce (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). In the context
used here, these agreements are created when a user accepts or agrees to complete a transac-
tion online; the agreement will often incorporate by reference the website’s terms of use and
privacy policy and will bind the user to the website’s payment terms and schedule. Similar to
those of a clickwrap agreement, the terms of an e-commerce agreement are often not
presented to the website user; the user must actively follow a link to read the agreement.
28. See generally “Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium, 104 Mich.
L. Rev. 821 (2006).
29. Margaret Jane Radin, Commentary, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and
the Waning of Consent, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1223, 1231 (2006).
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developments. Section I.B then demonstrates how this trend has heightened
children’s vulnerability, especially when entering into agreements online,
and justifies the resurgence of the infancy doctrine to protect them.
A. Nonnegotiable Contracts and Oppressive Terms
Classical contract theory recognized that, in a free-will system, it was
necessary to invalidate agreements that demonstrated a lack of free will in
the assent.30 This recognition formed the basis for the doctrines of uncon-
scionability,31 fraud and misrepresentation,32 and duress.33 Recent jurispru-
dence, however, reveals courts’ increasing willingness to uphold clauses that
would not have met traditional contract formation requirements34 and that
courts would traditionally have invalidated based on these doctrines.35 For
example, courts have reinforced the modern reality that consumer contracts
for the sale of goods or services are frequently not freely negotiated by en-
forcing boilerplate adhesion contracts where one contracting party did not
even see the contract’s terms until after the contract was formed.36 In doing
so, courts’ opinions have emphasized the economic benefits of form con-
tracts and boilerplate language,37 benefits which are magnified in the digital
marketplace. In the online arena, courts have also shown substantial defer-
ence to the “importance of supporting an emerging technology/digital mar-
ket, rather than pressuring businesses to draft non-negotiable contracts that
reflect reasonable and fair terms.”38
30. See id. at 72.
31. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981) (refusing to recognize
contracts where the resulting agreement was so bad that there must have been bad bargaining
in its creation).
32. See id. §§ 159–61, 163–64, 166 (invalidating an agreement where there is no real
consent because one party concealed or misrepresented facts to induce the formation of the
contract).
33. Id. § 175.
34. Preston & Crowther, supra note 12, at 73–74.
35. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–53 (2011) (re-
fusing to find mandatory arbitration provisions in cell phone contracts unconscionable).
36. E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–97 (1991) (upholding a
forum selection clause on a cruise ticket that the passenger had already purchased before being
presented with the terms on the grounds that enforcing the provision would not be funda-
mentally unfair because the passenger was unlikely to negotiate the terms anyway and benefit-
ted from lower ticket prices due to the corporation’s ability to self-insure against litigation);
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453–55 (7th Cir. 1996) (validating clickwrap licens-
ing by finding that a valid contract was formed when the defendant clicked “accept” to licens-
ing terms).
37. E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 594. For further discussion of the economics
of standard form contracts, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts
in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 827 (2006); David Gilo & Ariel Porat,
The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transac-
tion Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 983
(2006); and Radin, supra note 29.
38. Preston & McCann, supra note 25, at 12–13.
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Many modern contracts are not simply nonnegotiable; they are un-
modifiable. Consumers do not have the opportunity to counteroffer or ne-
gotiate the terms of use.39 Courts have reinforced this all-or-nothing, take-it-
or-leave-it approach by refusing to validate consumers’ attempts to alter
websites’ terms of use.40
Form contracts have also become replete with arduous terms that the
ordinary consumer would be hard-pressed to understand. While we may
expect adult consumers to have some facility with clauses pertaining to arbi-
tration requirements, warranty waivers, and forum selection clauses, it is
unlikely that they understand the full extent of these agreements.41 Moreo-
ver, in the event that consumers do try to read agreements, the terms often
contain arcane legalese.42 When form contracts are transposed into the digi-
tal world, a standard online agreement may give an OSP the unilateral right
to modify the contract, prohibit the contract’s transfer, grant the OSP the
power to terminate services, deny rights of survivorship (effectively deleting
the consumer’s online data and content in the event of death or deactiva-
tion), and afford the OSP the right to any and all creative content posted on
a website.43
Courts have increasingly upheld these terms.44 In so doing, they have
promoted the commercial efficiency of boilerplate agreements over the im-
position of nonnegotiable terms and expensive litigation on individuals.
Terms that were once seen as a means of “unfairly strip[ping] underdog
consumers of judicial rights” are now “prima facie valid.”45
B. The Effects of Nonnegotiable and Oppressive Terms on Children
In a world where contracts are formed effortlessly and where there is
essentially no opportunity to bargain or negotiate, children making agree-
ments online are more vulnerable than ever and require the protection of
the infancy doctrine.
39. Preston, supra note 18, at 267; see also Slade, supra note 9, at 630 (discussing the
transformation of contract formation from offer, acceptance, and negotiation to nonnegoti-
able, take-it-or-leave-it transactions).
40. See, e.g., A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 (E.D. Va. 2008) (up-
holding the clickwrap agreement of Turnitin.com and emphasizing that the inclusion of dis-
claimers by high school students that they “did not consent to the archiving of their works
[did] not modify the Agreement or render it unenforceable”), rev’d in part on other grounds,
562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
41. That is, if they even read the agreement or try to locate its terms. See, e.g., Robert A.
Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Back-
fire?, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 837, 840–41 (2006) (discussing reasons why consumers do not read
online contracts, including the “boilerplate’s lack of lucidity,” consumers’ lack of bargaining
power, and their difficulty in locating the online terms).
42. See Preston & McCann, supra note 25, at 22–23.
43. Id. at 23–27.
44. Preston & Crowther, supra note 12, at 75–76.
45. Id. at 74–77 (quoting Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Children predominantly enter into terms of service and agreements on
social networking, gaming, and e-commerce websites.46 In so doing, children
accept boilerplate terms, such as exclusive, nonappealable arbitration provi-
sions, venue and choice-of-law mandates, and dispute resolution require-
ments,47 without realizing the potential burdens and restrictions on
remedies that these terms entail. They may also grant OSPs “non-exclusive,
transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license[s]” to any intel-
lectual property shared with the websites, such as uploaded photographs and
videos.48 As a result, if a parent were concerned about his child having
uploaded a picture to Facebook, the parent would need to bring suit in
Santa Clara County, California regardless of the cost or burden of the loca-
tion. And Facebook would be able to assert that it had a license to use the
image regardless of whether the child even realized that there were terms of
service.49
The ease of e-commerce agreements raises separate concerns that chil-
dren will incur costs that their parents will have to pay, take on debt without
knowing anything about credit, and become engaged in “earn-and-spend”
lifestyles at young ages.50 For example, in making payments on Facebook,
children under the age of eighteen acknowledge that their parent or guard-
ian is involved in the transaction, that there may be additional terms and
fees at checkout (such as taxes, shipping costs, and courier terms), that
Facebook disclaims any and all warranties with respect to the transaction,
and that Facebook has no liability for any goods or services that are pur-
chased.51 A child’s parents may thus be held liable for nonpayment and may
be bound not only by Facebook’s terms but also by those of any third-party
providers whose applications and products are accessible through Facebook.
Finally, in accepting terms of service, children consent to websites’ use
of cookies and data-mining techniques that track their internet presence and
preferences. This consent allows websites to target advertisements to chil-
dren’s browsing habits, perpetuating the cycle of children entering into en-
forceable yet adhesive contracts.
Unfortunately, courts have so far been reticent to leverage the infancy
doctrine in these scenarios,52 mirroring the general trend toward upholding
form agreements. The few recent cases applying the infancy doctrine reveal
both courts’ confusion about the infancy doctrine’s contours in the online
46. See infra text accompanying note 92.
47. See Preston, supra note 18, at 263–65.
48. E.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/
legal/terms (last updated Dec. 11, 2012).
49. Id.
50. Slade, supra note 9, at 634–36.
51. User Payments Terms, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/payments_terms (last
updated Feb. 4, 2013).
52. See Preston & Crowther, supra note 12, at 66–71 (discussing possible reasons for the
paucity of recent cases applying the infancy doctrine: lack of awareness about the doctrine,
confusion about its contours, and the ability of OSPs to settle or threaten to terminate the use
of services).
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world and courts’ tendency to enforce nonnegotiable, oppressive boilerplate.
In E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., the minor plaintiffs alleged that
Facebook had violated their privacy by using their names and likenesses in
commercial endorsements.53 First, the court refused to apply the infancy
doctrine to bar Facebook from enforcing the forum selection clause in its
terms of service.54 In refusing to allow the plaintiffs the protection of the
infancy doctrine, the court conducted a cursory and errant application of
the retained-benefits defense that was overbroad and, if adopted widely,
would risk making all children’s online contracts enforceable.55 More impor-
tantly for this Note, the court concluded that the forum selection clause was
reasonable.56 The court found that the appearance of hyperlinks on every
page of the website was sufficient for the children to have constructive
knowledge of the actual terms in the terms of service; it then emphasized
that the children residing in Illinois should have considered any potential
inconvenience of needing to litigate in California before accepting the terms
of service.57 The court’s analysis and conclusion in E.K.D. reveals the vulner-
ability of children to boilerplate online terms when children are not pro-
tected by the infancy doctrine.
Similarly, in A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC,58 the court relied on a distorted
application of the retained-benefits exception to prevent the child-plaintiffs
from benefitting from the infancy doctrine. As a result, even though stu-
dents who were required to use the plagiarism website Turnitin.com to sub-
mit their schoolwork had written disclaimers on their papers withholding
permission from the website to archive their work, the students were prohib-
ited from disaffirming the website’s terms of use that allowed for archiving.59
Through a paradigmatic adhesion contract, the children were forced to jeop-
ardize their intellectual property without the ability to negotiate the terms of
its use.
Although an examination of the retained-benefits exception to the in-
fancy doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note, these cases highlight how a
legal environment that precludes the application of the infancy doctrine af-
fects children’s online contracts. The result of such a legal landscape effec-
tively ignores the policy rationale for protecting children in favor of the
competing policy of encouraging online efficiency. Ultimately, the doctrinal
evolution of contract law and the prevalence of boilerplate in online terms
53. 885 F. Supp. 2d 894, 897 (S.D. Ill. 2012).
54. E.K.D., 885 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
55. See id. at 899–900.
56. Id. at 900–03.
57. Id. at 901–02.
58. 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 562 F.3d 630
(4th Cir. 2009).
59. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481. But cf. Deck v. Spartz, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-01123,
2011 WL 7775067, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (finding a forum selection clause unen-
forceable because a child who had entered into a joint venture to expand his Twitter feed into a
suite of internet products sought to disaffirm).
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of service have increased the vulnerability of children online and magnified
the need to protect them through the infancy doctrine.
II. The Interaction of Children and Online Content
The manner in which children navigate and make decisions online rein-
forces the need for the infancy doctrine, which includes limiting the use of
misrepresentation-of-age statutes as a means of preventing children from
disaffirming their online agreements. Section II.A analyzes children’s digital
literacy as an impediment to children’s assent to online agreements, with an
emphasis on the deficiencies in children’s online, as opposed to print-text,
cognitive capacities. Section II.B examines the impact of online advertising
on children’s browsing habits and argues that children’s unique susceptibil-
ity to online advertisements creates a cycle whereby children are induced
into passively accepting terms of service without recognizing the legal
consequences.
A. Children’s Digital Literacy
The infancy doctrine emerged due to the belief that children lack the
cognitive capacity to assent to agreements.60 Although courts have since re-
laxed the requirements for assent, an examination of the ability of children
to assent—to agree after “thoughtful consideration”61—to contract terms
online is necessary to understand the infancy doctrine’s relation to the on-
line forum. Children’s ability to agree is intimately tied to their ability to
read, comprehend, and integrate online content with their knowledge of the
world.62 But the internet is an unbounded world.63 And concern about the
effect on young people of “unguided, uncritical access to information” is
almost as old as the written word itself.64
Traditionally, people have conceived of literacy as an individual’s ability
to decode print-based texts.65 Achieving literacy fluency involves a progres-
sion from recognizing and translating the features of words (their alphabet,
60. See discussion supra Introduction.
61. Assent, Merriam–Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assent
(last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
62. See Maryanne Wolf, Proust and the Squid: The Story and Science of the
Reading Brain 218 (2007).
63. In April 2013 there were more than 144 million top-level domains on the web.
Domain Counts & Internet Statistics, Whois Source, http://www.whois.sc/internet-statistics/
(last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
64. See Wolf, supra note 62, at 220 (examining the development of literacy and com-
paring the modern world of hypertext and online searches with Socrates’s concern that young
people would be unable to perform critical and analytical thinking if they had unimpaired
access to information).
65. See Mark Warschauer & Paige Ware, Learning, Change, and Power: Competing
Frames of Technology, in Handbook of Research on New Literacies 215 (Julie Coiro et al.
eds., 2008). Text-based comprehension can be divided into four categories: code breaking,
meaning making (semantic competence), functional text usage (pragmatic competence), and
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phonology, spelling, and structure) to incorporating cultural knowledge
about words’ meanings and recognizing that the structure, tone, formality,
and ideology of the text may affect these meanings.66 Understandably, a
child’s brain must undergo significant reading development to achieve liter-
acy fluency.67
Children develop at different rates, so researchers are reluctant to state
at what age a child should attain each level of reading fluency.68 Regardless,
the literature on children’s emerging literacy emphasizes the extent to which
children’s apparent ability to read text may not reflect their “understanding”
of it. An ongoing concern throughout children’s reading development is
their ability to differentiate between simply reading—translating the words
on the page as quickly as possible—and true fluency—thinking, compre-
hending, and understanding the text.69 Therefore, if we require a contracting
party to have even a basic understanding before we enforce contractual lia-
bility, it is highly questionable that we could ever ascribe such an under-
standing to children’s reading of fine-print terms of service or boilerplate.
And children’s literacy online may be even more limited than the print-
based developments just described. The basic ability to decode and under-
stand online information has been termed “digital literacy.”70 Digital literacy
expands the foundational skills of print-based literacy because it requires
text criticism (critical analysis). Allan Luke & Peter Freebody, Further Notes on the Four Re-
sources Model, Reading Online (Aug. 1999), http://www.readingonline.org/research/
lukefreebody.html.
66. Luke & Freebody, supra note 65; see also Wolf, supra note 62, at 84–85 (explaining
that children’s reading development can be divided into four categories: phonological develop-
ment—a child’s ability to hear, discriminate, and manipulate the sounds within words; seman-
tic development—the growth in vocabulary that allows for an increased understanding of
words’ meanings; syntactic development—the ability to use grammatical relationships to un-
derstand complex sentences; and pragmatic development—the ability to use “socio-cultural
‘rules’ of language”).
67. Children’s developing literacy can be divided into various stages: the emerging prer-
eader, novice readers, decoding readers, fluent comprehending readers, and expert readers.
Wolf, supra note 62, at 114–15; see also Jeanne S. Chall, Stages of Reading Development
(Harcourt Brace Coll. Publishers 2d ed. 1996) (1983) (describing five stages of reading: initial
reading or decoding (pre-elementary school), confirmation and fluency (ages seven to eight),
reading for learning the new (elementary and middle school), multiple viewpoints (high
school students ages fourteen to eighteen), and construction and reconstruction (college)).
This development is marked by a transformation in the reading child’s brain as the child
learns to automate the visual reading process and focus on the more cognitively complex
aspects of reading. Wolf, supra note 62, at 143.
68. See Chall, supra note 67, at 11–12, 25–26 (emphasizing that the stages are overlap-
ping and do not form discrete milestones; development at each stage is axiomatically depen-
dent on the achievement in the prior stage and is affected by external factors such as home
environment).
69. Wolf, supra note 62, at 130–32.
70. See Warschauer & Ware, supra note 65, at 215; see also Wolf, supra note 62, at 156
(mentioning that adults read more discriminatingly, sensitively, and associatively than children
because of their cognitive expertise and life experience).
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children to make meaning from multitextual, visual, and symbolic sources.71
When children are online, they are not merely reading the words on the
screen; they are simultaneously bombarded by moving advertisement ban-
ners, distracting hyperlinks, variously colored and sized fonts, and pop-up
screens promising gifts and prizes. In such an environment, a child’s com-
prehension is inherently bounded by “time and cognitive and physical con-
straints.”72 These limitations on digital comprehension impact not just a
child’s understanding, or “reading,” of online text but also his understand-
ing of the contract formation process itself.
Insofar as digital literacy requires children to account for all of these
distractions while decoding the text on the screen, there is the obvious po-
tential for substantial limitations on a child’s online comprehension. There
is a stark contrast between a child sitting at a desk with a paper contract in
front of him and a child sitting behind a computer screen being asked if
“yes,” he would like to access a website. In the first situation, the child has a
simple yes-or-no decision, and the terms of the agreement, if the child wants
to read or question them, are right in front of him. In the online example,
the child must first tune out the website’s audiovisual features (which were
created to induce potential users to want to use the website), then recognize
that in accessing the website there are attendant terms of use, and finally
click on a hyperlink that is in a tiny font in order to view the terms. All of
these decisions must precede the child actually attempting to understand the
terms of the agreement itself. This more extensive online literacy process
means that a child’s digital literacy may fall far short of a child’s print-based
literacy.
The result is that children act online within a “bounded rationality” and
“satisfice”—that is, choose outcomes that “suit their purposes but that are
not necessarily the optimal outcomes.”73 Simply put, children freely accept
online agreements because they want to use websites; they often do so with-
out realizing that they are entering into a contract—let alone realizing that
they do not understand the meaning or implications of its terms.
Beyond the impact of digital literacy on the contract formation process,
children’s “deep reading” skills are also inferior online, limiting children’s
understanding of digital text.74 Deep reading refers to a reader’s ability to
71. Warschauer & Ware, supra note 65, at 215; see also Bridget Dalton & C. Patrick
Proctor, The Changing Landscape of Text and Comprehension in the Age of New Literacies, in
Handbook of Research on New Literacies, supra note 65, at 297–98 (discussing the effects
of the nonlinear, multimodal, visual, interactive, and unbounded nature of digital reading and
its implications for how to “understand understanding”).
72. Denise E. Agosto, A Model of Young People’s Decision-Making in Using the Web, 24
Libr. & Info. Sci. Res. 311, 311 (2002).
73. Id. at 312. See also infra Section III.B.2 for an analysis of why children who satisfice
should receive protection from contracts when adults who act similarly do not.
74. Maryanne Wolf & Mirit Barzillai, The Importance of Deep Reading, Educ. Leader-
ship, Mar. 2009, at 32, 36.
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engage in sophisticated text translation and comprehension processes.75 It
takes children years to develop these skills and their development is under-
mined by the emphasis of digital media on providing immediate informa-
tion that affords instant gratification and relies on a media-driven rather
than text-based cognitive set.76 The emphasis of digital text on easily accessi-
ble online sources engenders “passive” interactions with online content that
discourage deliberation in both reading and thinking.77 Digital text therefore
pushes back against deep reading skills, leading to “more easily ‘deluded’ ”
readers.78 At the same time, children lack the “executive, organizational, crit-
ical, and self-monitoring skills” to deconstruct such text, so they are espe-
cially susceptible to being led astray by unknown terms.79
Our concept of what it means to “understand” digital text is still evolv-
ing as scholars attempt to integrate “knowledge of reading comprehension
based on print technology and the world of books with our emerging
knowledge of comprehension in new literacies spaces such as hypertexts and
[websites].”80 Current literature suggests that “explicit instruction” focused
on “comprehension processes in online reading” must be accompanied by
traditional print-text reading development to ensure that children attain
fundamental “deep-reading” literacy.81 Therefore, until our education sys-
tem truly embraces the convergence of deep-reading and digital literacy, we
must remain suspect of children’s understanding of online information.
B. Children’s Susceptibility to Online Advertising
Children’s online vulnerability extends not just to their limited ability to
understand and process online information but also to their difficulty pay-
ing attention to relevant information. Children often have trouble identify-
ing relevant content online because they get distracted by peripheral
imagery.82 Moreover, many children fail to identify the differences between
actual content and advertising.83 With the commercialization of the in-
ternet,84 children’s susceptibility to online advertising and the ease of e-com-
merce are key issues for contract lawyers, corporate executives, and
marketing agencies alike.
75. These processes include “inferential and deductive reasoning, analogical skills, criti-
cal analysis, reflection, and insight.” Id. at 33.
76. See id. at 32.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 35.
79. Id.
80. Dalton & Proctor, supra note 71, at 297.
81. Wolf & Barzillai, supra note 74, at 37.
82. Matthew S. Eastin et al., Children of the Net: An Empirical Exploration into the Eval-
uation of Internet Content, 50 J. Broadcasting & Electronic Media 211, 212–14 (2006).
83. Id.
84. See Bettina Fabos, The Price of Information: Critical Literacy, Education, and Today’s
Internet, in Handbook of Research on New Literacies, supra note 65, at 839–40.
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Although people originally conceived of the internet as a democratic
environment—a creative commons different from existing commercial mass
media in its ability to foster free expression—the 2000s witnessed the in-
ternet’s recasting as a forum for commercial entertainment and business.85
Search engines such as Yahoo! and Google have transformed from informa-
tion-navigating services that relied on revenue from syndication to con-
glomerates that generate revenue through paid advertisements and fees for
search prioritization.86 In 2011, internet advertising revenue in the United
States totaled $31.74 billion, a 22% increase from 2010; meanwhile, 47% of
this advertising revenue came from the use of search engines and 22% from
the use of display and banner advertisements.87 Notably, 22% of 2011 adver-
tising revenue ($7.1 billion of $31.7 billion in total 2011 advertising revenue)
came from retail advertisers.88 In addition, websites routinely track user in-
terests so that they can target advertisements and attract consumer
attention.89
This commercialization of the internet does not distinguish between
child and adult users. In fact, advertising is increasingly directed at chil-
dren.90 As early as 2000, more than 67% of child-oriented websites were
supported by advertising.91 And 80% of teens ages twelve through seventeen
use online social networking websites such as Myspace or Facebook92 (web-
sites that rely heavily on advertising revenue and targeted advertisements),
while 48% use the internet for online shopping.93
85. Id.
86. Id. at 851. For example, Google AdWords allows any business to create advertise-
ments and “choose keywords” associated with the business so that when people search on
Google, the “ad may appear next to or above the search results.” Advertise Your Business on
Google, Google AdWords, http://www.google.com/ads/adwords2/#tab0=0 (last visited Apr. 5,
2013).
87. Interactive Advertising Bureau, IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report
12 (2012), available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_Internet_Advertising_Revenue_
Report_FY_2011.pdf.
88. Id. at 7, 15. This represents the largest category of internet advertisement spending,
followed by telecom company advertisements. Id. at 15. The leading U.S. internet advertiser,
IAC/Interactive, expended $316.2 million in 2011, while other top spenders included AT&T
($245.7 million), Verizon ($230.3 million), Amazon.com ($199.8 million), and eBay ($173.2
million). Kantar Media Reports U.S. Advertising Expenditures Increased 0.8 Percent in 2011,
Bus. Wire (Mar. 12, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120312
005272/en/Kantar-Media-Reports-U.S.-Advertising-Expenditures-Increased.
89. Dalton & Proctor, supra note 71, at 297–98 (noting that digital text can “read the
reader,” collecting information through users’ interactions with websites and offering choices
of content and products accordingly).
90. Louis J. Moses & Dare A. Baldwin, What Can the Study of Cognitive Development
Reveal About Children’s Ability to Appreciate and Cope with Advertising?, 24 J. Pub. Pol’y &
Marketing 186, 186 (2005).
91. Lucy L. Henke & Gwen Fontenot, Children and Internet Use: Perceptions of Advertis-
ing, Privacy, and Functional Displacement, J. Bus. & Econ. Res., Nov. 2007, at 59.
92. Trend Data (Teens), Pew Internet, http://pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data
-%28Teens%29/Online-Activites-Total.aspx (last updated May 2012).
93. Id.
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Developmentally, children should be capable of recognizing the purpose
of advertising by the age of three.94 And between the ages of six and eight,
most children develop an understanding of bias in advertising and the pro-
motional intent of the advertiser.95 While children may be conceptually
competent, however, they may not apply this understanding online because
doing so requires the use of executive-function skills that undergo consider-
able development throughout childhood and adolescence.96
The cognitive abilities associated with executive functioning include in-
hibitory control, impulse control, resistance to interference, selective atten-
tion, and focused attention.97 Development of these skills is tied to the
“maturation of the prefrontal cortex of the brain,” which is the last region of
the brain to develop.98 As a result, when engaged online, children are more
likely to demonstrate poor self-control, impulsivity, poor judgment in deci-
sionmaking contexts, difficulty in planning ahead, and a failure to integrate
knowledge with future goals.99
In addition, children are susceptible to the “serendipity effect,”100 mean-
ing that when something on a website piques a child’s interest or attracts his
attention, the child becomes distracted and motivated to satisfy his new in-
terest. Once motivated, the child is far more likely to forget his initial web-
navigating intentions and to navigate solely with the new goal in mind.101
Consequently, children’s immature executive-function skills and dis-
tractibility make them vulnerable to online advertisements. Children can be
“perceptually seduced” by salient and pleasing audiovisual effects.102 And
“even if they have processed an advertisement effectively,” children may cre-
ate accounts, accept terms, or engage in purchases “against their better judg-
ment.”103 Rather than just creating an account on Facebook, a child may
then be enticed to play or download games like FarmVille or Candy Crush
Saga. In comparison, adults are often more immune to many advertising
tactics and have the benefit of product experience.104
In accepting the use of these applications, a child accepts the third-party
terms of service that appear in a tiny hyperlink at the bottom of the infor-
mation page touting the game’s features. Through these terms of service, the






100. Kimberly A. Lawless & P.G. Schrader, Where Do We Go Now? Understanding Re-
search on Navigation in Complex Digital Environments, in Handbook of Research on New
Literacies, supra note 65, at 267, 284.
101. Id.
102. Moses & Baldwin, supra note 90, at 195.
103. Id. at 194; see also Lawless & Schrader, supra note 100, at 277 (highlighting that
children’s navigation decisions align with their areas of interest).
104. See Moses & Baldwin, supra note 90, at 195.
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child represents that he is “at least 13 years old” and that, if he is “between
13 years and 18 years old, [his] legal guardian has reviewed and agrees to
[the] terms.”105 Furthermore, the child acknowledges that he can only
purchase any virtual currency associated with the game if he is “at least 18
years old.”106
The psychology of children’s responses to online advertisements reveals
that children are far more likely than adults to be tempted and distracted by
online advertisements that bombard them with commercial opportunities
and attractive websites. Furthermore, children are also far less capable of
understanding the terms of these websites or of performing the critical anal-
ysis needed to make decisions in the “websphere” (such as agreeing to a
website’s terms of service or making an account to access products and web
services).107 As a result, children are effectively induced into engaging with
websites—ones that include hidden agreements attesting that the user has
the capacity to contract or is over the age of eighteen—without understand-
ing the potential implications of their activities.
III. Misrepresentation-of-Age Statutes as an Outdated Defense
Unfortunately, the current state of the infancy doctrine is insufficient to
offer children the full protection they need online. Several states have mis-
representation-of-age statutes.108 These statutes prevent children from disaf-
firming contracts where they misrepresented that they were of the age of
majority and the other party had a “good reason to believe that the minor
was capable of contracting.”109
Section III.A argues that courts should either limit misrepresentation-
of-age statutes in their application to children’s online contracts or not ap-
ply these statutes to children’s online contracts at all because the need to
protect children online outweighs the policy considerations behind such
105. Games on Facebook—Terms of Service, King, http://candycrush.king.com/legal/face
book/tos.jsp (last updated Dec. 6, 2011); see also Terms of Service, Zynga, http://company.
zynga.com/legal/terms-of-service (last updated Sept. 30, 2011) (“If you are between the ages of
13 and 17, you represent that your legal guardian has reviewed and agreed to these Terms. . . .
You shall not create an Account or access the Service if you are under the age of 13 . . . . You
agree to pay all fees and applicable taxes incurred by you or anyone using an Account regis-
tered to you.”).
106. King, supra note 105.
107. See discussion supra Section II.A.
108. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 599.3 (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-103 (2000); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.1403 (1979); Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-3 (LexisNexis 2009); Wash. Rev.
Code § 26.28.040 (2012).
109. 5 Williston & Lord, supra note 3, at § 9:22. Outside the context of these statutes,
though, a minor is generally not precluded from asserting the infancy defense when he has
misrepresented his age. Id. Some states, however, have judicially rejected this rule. Id. This
Note will just focus on statutory exceptions. See Preston, supra note 18, at 248–52, for a
discussion of misrepresentation-of-age defenses under estoppel, arguing that estoppel princi-
ples require “justified,” “good faith” reliance, so minors’ online contracts should remain disaf-
firmable because OSPs fail to take adequate precautions to verify users’ ages. See also
discussion infra Section III.B.
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statutes. Section III.B then rebuts arguments that courts should find the
misrepresentation-of-age defense more applicable to online contracts be-
cause of the difficulty of determining age online and because children’s deci-
sionmaking online is functionally similar to that of adults.
A. Misrepresentation-of-Age Statutes in the Online Forum
The language of misrepresentation-of-age statutes commonly provides
that a minor cannot disaffirm an agreement when he misrepresented his
own age or acted as an adult when he engaged in business.110 Such a formu-
lation suggests that these statutes were designed to protect adults who en-
gage in business or consumer transactions with children. Furthermore, cases
in which courts have applied the statutes reveal that courts have emphasized
the “engaged in business” prong of the statutes to protect adults in signifi-
cant face-to-face consumer transactions.111 In finding that children misrep-
resented their age, courts have looked not only at visible representations of
age but also representations about past contracts made, financial resources,
and family and marital statuses. These statutes, however, preceded the explo-
sion of the internet, especially the development of browsewrap and e-com-
merce,112 and there have been no cases applying the statutes to children’s
online transactions.113
110. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 599.3 (“No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where,
on account of the minor’s own misrepresentations as to the minor’s majority, or from the
minor’s having engaged in business as an adult, the other party had good reason to believe the
minor capable of contracting.”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-103 (substantially the same language);
Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-3 (substantially the same language); cf. Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.1403 (limiting the defense to where the minor misrepresented his age for the purpose of
securing “goods, wares, merchandise or chattels” or “securing the loan of money”).
111. E.g., Pottawatomie Airport & Flying Serv., Inc. v. Winger, 271 P.2d 754, 758 (Kan.
1954) (finding a bailment contract for an airplane binding on a minor who had a bank ac-
count, engaged in farming and raising cattle, and represented that he had purchased cars
because the “[p]laintiff had good reasons to believe defendant capable of contracting and was
mislead [sic] by defendant Winger’s implied misrepresentations as to his age, and from his
having engaged in business and handled his business affairs as an adult” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Dillon v. Burnham, Hanna, Munger & Co., 22 P. 1016, 1018 (Kan. 1890)
(finding that a minor’s repeated misrepresentations of age to buy goods and secure credit
satisfied the statutory requirement for the adult to be “deceived either by the minor’s direct
misrepresentation, or by implied misrepresentation by reason of his conduct in carrying on
business as though he was legally capable of doing so”); Harvey v. Hadfield, 372 P.2d 985, 987
(Utah 1962) (explaining that the purpose of Utah’s misrepresentation-of-age statute was not
“simply to make the other party a judge of the abilities of the minor and to enable him to bind
the latter if he thinks the minor is sufficiently intelligent and perspicacious that he should be
bound by his contract. Its purpose is to protect the other party if the minor has engaged in
business so that the other party, even though using ordinary caution and prudence, is never-
theless justifiably misled into believing that he is dealing with an adult capable of
contracting”).
112. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-103 (enacted 1868); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1403
(enacted 1961); Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-3 (enacted 1898).
113. A WestlawNext search of the statutes’ citing references conducted on September
29, 2012 revealed this information and also revealed that very few cases have applied these
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The terms of service on most websites contain hidden attestations that
users have the capacity—are of the legal age—to contract. Moreover, most
“OSPs do not provide any warning that they plan to rely on such representa-
tions [of age tucked into the terms of service] or warn that to accept services
if the representation is not true will result in consequences.”114 For example,
the Yahoo! Kids website has a tiny hyperlink at the bottom of the page,
which leads to the website’s “Terms of Service.”115 The Terms of Service then
state, “In consideration of your use of the Yahoo! Services, you represent
that you are of legal age to form a binding contract . . . .” The Terms then
provide that “parents of children under the age of 13 who wish to allow their
children access to the Yahoo! Services must create a Yahoo! Family Account”
and that in making a family account, “you certify that you are at least 18
years old.”116 Similarly, Amazon.com only requires an email address to create
an account; once created, the website immediately begins giving suggestions
for purchases. Although the website never requires a user to represent his
age, the website’s “Conditions of Use” state that it is intended only for adults
ages eighteen or older.117
Online advertisements targeted toward children—whether express mar-
keting by retail institutions or websites, or social media touting their services
and gaming applications—lure children to create online accounts and to
make online purchases.118 In performing these acts, children enter into legal
agreements in which they make either express or implied representations
that they meet the terms of service and therefore misrepresent their ages.
Consequently, because of state misrepresentation-of-age statutes, children
frequently and unwittingly enter into nondisaffirmable contracts through
their online transactions.
statutes to any scenario within the last several decades. Moreover, these statutes seem to di-
rectly contravene the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, creating further uncertainty as to their
current interpretation. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 14 reporter’s note cmt. c
(1981) (“Traditionally, however the infant’s misrepresentation of age and the other party’s
reasonable reliance upon it have not been considered.”).
114. Preston, supra note 18, at 248. Although Preston concludes that such hidden repre-
sentations are harmless, Preston’s analysis relies on estoppel principles, id. at 248–50, which
are arguably more stringent than the principles imposed by statute.
115. Yahoo! Kids, kids.yahoo.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
116. Yahoo! Terms of Service, Yahoo!, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-
173.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2012).
117. Conditions of Use, amazon.com, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/dis-
play.html/ref=ox_signin_condition_of_use?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088&pop-up=1 (last up-
dated Dec. 5, 2012) (“Amazon does sell products for children, but it sells them to adults . . . . If
you are under 18, you may use the Amazon Services only with involvement of a parent or
guardian.”).
118. There has been a proliferation of credit and debit cards in the hands of children
granting them previously untold purchasing power; websites now exist specifically dedicated to
advertising credit cards for children and educating parents on their benefits. See Slade, supra
note 9, at 633–34. Considering the difficulty for parents in monitoring their children’s internet
use, the financial risks of children’s consumer behavior (either with their own credit cards or
their parents’) are real. Id. at 636–37.
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The age-old philosophy for allowing minors to void contracts—protect-
ing them from both their own flawed judgment and adults or companies
that may take advantage of their naı¨vete´—holds especially true in the online
context. The commercialization of the online forum, especially the funds
expended by OSPs on advertisements targeting children, has rendered chil-
dren more vulnerable both to their own poor judgment in making online
accounts and, more significantly, to exploitation by websites that employ
hidden terms and clickwrap. While there is societal value to merchants ex-
ploiting the convenience and efficiency of online transactions and boiler-
plate terms, and there is also the risk that, in some instances, applying the
infancy doctrine would allow adolescents to “shirk[ ] responsibilities under-
taken with full understanding and appreciation of their acts,”119 the current
framework suggests that OSPs are not deterred by the risks of children disaf-
firming their contracts.120 Therefore, the heightened vulnerability of children
online and the risk that courts will bind them to oppressive terms and im-
provident purchases should outweigh the need to protect the adults doing
business with them.
The online environment does not align with the commercial context
within which these statutes were promulgated, where agreements included
the physical assessment of age and investigation into capacity to contract by
way of financial, employment, and prior-experience verification. Conse-
quently, courts should not blindly or strictly apply misrepresentation-of-age
statutes to children’s online agreements.
B. Deconstructing Arguments Against the Doctrine
Although this Note and much recent scholarship call for a revitalization
of the infancy doctrine,121 others claim that the infancy doctrine is outdated,
particularly in the online world.122 Section III.B.1 rebuts the argument that
OSPs need misrepresentation-of-age statutes to provide protection from in-
advertently contracting with minors because of the difficulty of verifying age
online. Section III.B.2 critiques suggestions that, in the modern contract era,
adults exhibit similar limits on their cognitive assent to contracts as do mi-
nors, so there is no justification for giving minors a “protective shield.”123
This Section concludes that not only do these arguments fail to account for
the underlying policy reasons that still support the infancy defense but they
119. Daniel, supra note 2, at 257.
120. But cf. id. at 258 (arguing that, because merchants rely on children as a large seg-
ment of the consumer pool, the infancy doctrine risks denying society “access to an expanding
world of e-commerce”).
121. See, e.g., Preston & Crowther, supra note 12; Slade, supra note 9.
122. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 292–94 (contending that minors are not
naı¨ve, and that, as consumers in the marketplace, they may have capacity to contract whereby
an “overbroad infancy doctrine will be depriving legitimate consumers of access to the mar-
ketplace”); Daniel, supra note 2, at 241 (“To effectively advance electronic commerce, the lack
of minor accountability regarding contractual obligations must be reexamined.”).
123. Daniel, supra note 2, at 251.
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also exemplify why misrepresentation-of-age statutes are incongruent with
the online transactions of minors.
1. Inadequacy of Age-Verification Techniques
Arguments that allowing minors to disaffirm online contracts stymies
the efficient development of e-commerce focus on the difficulty of verifying
children’s ages online.124 Admittedly, investigating age is more difficult on-
line. OSPs cannot directly observe whether the user who is accepting their
terms appears to be a minor. And although concerns for child safety online
have led advocates to seek age-verification technology, there is a general con-
sensus among artificial-intelligence specialists, web developers, and online
merchants that age verification is ineffective.125
At the same time, children make up a large segment of the online mar-
ket, generating advertising and commercial revenue. This potential for fi-
nancial gain discourages companies from actively investigating the age of
web users and undermines the policy behind misrepresentation-of-age stat-
utes in protecting adults who are misled into contracting with minors. OSPs
derive substantial advertising revenue and long-term brand recognition by
attracting child users.126 For example, the more children that access websites
such as Facebook, the more websites can tailor advertisements to the chil-
dren’s interests and the “more potential advertising dollars can be gener-
ated.”127 These websites increasingly stake their future profits on their ability
to lure and retain the child market.128
This profit potential motivates many websites’ resistance to federal legis-
lation regulating the use of and access to children’s information online.129 It
also provides companies with a disincentive to truly try to verify the age of
their users to avoid contracting with children, let alone to implement the
expensive and cumbersome systems of verifying credit cards and driver’s
124. See id. at 257.
125. Nicole Perlroth, Big Hurdles in Verifying Ages Online, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2012, at
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/technology/verifying-ages-online-is-a-
daunting-task-even-for-experts.html?_r=2&emc=eta1& (outlining proposed methods of ver-
ification ranging from voice recordings or fingerprint tracers to a national database).
126. Somini Sengupta, Groups Urge Facebook Not to Aim Ads at Children Under 13, N.Y.
Times Bits Blog (June 18, 2012, 6:36 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/groups-
urge-facebook-not-to-aim-ads-at-children-under-13/?emc=ETa1.
127. Emily Bazelon, The Young and the Friended, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2011 (Magazine),
at 15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/magazine/why-facebook-is-after-your-
kids.html?_r=0.
128. See id. For example, Facebook has been in negotiations with Disney to allow chil-
dren onto its website, and it is seeking to expand its platform for targeting the “fast-growing
market for children’s games.” Anton Troianovski & Shayndi Raice, Facebook Explores Giving
Kids Access, Wall St. J., June 4, 2012, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702303506404577444711741019238.html. In 2011, 12 percent of Facebook’s
revenue—$3.7 billion—came from its share of revenue from interactive games like FarmVille.
Id.
129. See Bazelon, supra note 127.
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licenses that some industries use to confirm the online identities of consum-
ers.130 Consequently, the majority of websites do very little in terms of age
verification.131 While some websites ask users to input their date of birth,
many just rely on the hidden terms in their conditions of use by which users
“acknowledge” that they are over eighteen years old or old enough to enter
into the agreement.132 If these hidden acknowledgements are sufficient to
constitute a misrepresentation for the purpose of misrepresentation-of-age
statutes, then OSPs can easily draft nondisaffirmable contracts that impose
oppressive and onerous contract requirements on unsuspecting children—
and they have no incentive not to!
Instead of “see[ing] the risk of contracting with minors and their unfet-
tered ability to disaffirm the transaction as outweighing the benefits of read-
ily engaging in e-commerce,”133 the feeble attempts made by OSPs to avoid
contracting with minors suggest that OSPs have accepted the inherent risks
in these transactions.134 In light of this behavior by OSPs, the difficulty in
online age verification is insufficient to outweigh the infancy doctrine’s sub-
stantial policy interest in protecting children online from misguided
agreements.135
2. Bounded Rationality in an Unbounded World
Despite the fact that rational decisionmaking has always been touted as
a fundamental principle of mutual assent, research has revealed that most
adults do not make fully reasoned, purely rational choices. Instead, they act
within a “bounded rationality.”136 Most contracting parties place voluntary
limits on their cognition by “fail[ing] to become . . . fully-informed market
participant[s]”; they “informally weigh[ ] the costs associated with obtaining
and processing all relevant information against the foreseeable risks of hav-
ing to deal with an undesired event.”137 Since both adults and children “are
likely to act with a lack of full knowledge concerning all available options,”
some scholars have concluded that “no apparent difference exists between
the actual behavior of adults and minors to warrant” protecting children
through the infancy doctrine.138
Although adults may not be the rational decisionmakers that classical
theorists once contemplated, that does not mean that adults and children are
130. Perlroth, supra note 125 (noting measures taken by the pornography industry to
verify age).
131. Preston, supra note 18, at 250–51.
132. See discussion supra Section III.A (using Amazon.com and Yahoo! as examples of
websites that target children but do very little to verify their age).
133. Daniel, supra note 2, at 257–58.
134. Preston, supra note 18, at 250–51.
135. See Slade, supra note 9, at 625.
136. Agosto, supra note 72, at 312.
137. Daniel, supra note 2, at 250–51.
138. Id. at 251.
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in the same decisionmaking category. Adults have a greater “market sensibil-
ity,” so, when making decisions online, they perform more sophisticated
cost–benefit analyses with greater consideration of the potential pitfalls.139 In
contrast, “[c]hildren are less knowledgeable about the real world,” so they
“cannot evaluate the legitimacy of . . . [i]nternet content” or know based on
experience that they should consider fine print or be skeptical of online
terms.140
Furthermore, children’s lack of experience ties directly into their digital
illiteracy, limiting their decisionmaking abilities and understanding of on-
line agreements.141 While an adult’s cost–benefit analysis may include a su-
perficial click on the terms-of-service hyperlink or a presumption that the
terms will include warranty disclaimers or limits on remedies, it is far less
likely that a child’s cost–benefit analysis will consider the possibility of such
restrictions, let alone age limits.
We hold adults to contracts that require little affirmative manifestation
of assent, contain few bargained-for terms, and are replete with practically
foreign legalese relating to arbitration provisions, jurisdiction, venue, and
injunctive relief; nonetheless, this does not mean that society would choose
to enforce similar contracts against children, who are inherently more naı¨ve
and impulsive.142 Society has historically placed greater responsibility on
adults to understand the world around them and to be accountable for their
decisions.143 Consequently, although adults are more vulnerable when acting
online than in traditional face-to-face transactions, the vulnerability of
adults does not mean that we should remove protections for children. The
infancy doctrine’s policy of protecting minors remains valid.
IV. Legislative Review or Judicial Resolution
So far, this Note has argued for the continued relevance of the infancy
doctrine as well as for a reappraisal of the application of misrepresentation
statutes to children’s online contracts. That misrepresentation-of-age stat-
utes have rarely been applied in recent years144 further suggests that they may
be antiquated and in need of refining in the internet era.145 Alternatively, the
139. See Slade, supra note 9, at 629.
140. Eastin et al., supra note 82, at 211.
141. See discussion supra Section II.A.
142. Slade, supra note 9, at 628–32.
143. See id. at 631 (“[A]dults are expected to accept the risks of their economic pur-
suits, to research answers, to consult financial planners, and to otherwise ensure that they are
getting a fair deal.”).
144. Based on March 16, 2013 WestlawNext searches of the citing references for Iowa
Code § 599.3 (2011), Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-103 (2000), and Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-3 (Lex-
isNexis 2009), there are twenty-two cases citing Iowa’s misrepresentation-of-age statute (the
most recent in 1955), five cases citing Kansas’s misrepresentation-of-age statute, and three
cases citing Utah’s misrepresentation-of-age statute.
145. Cf. Preston & Crowther, supra note 12, at 67 n.101 (“Like most well-defined doc-
trines, the infancy doctrine was most frequently litigated and discussed while its parameters
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lack of disputes with respect to online services may reflect the facility with
which OSPs can cancel minors’ accounts, use their position to persuade mi-
nors that they have no realistic remedy, incorporate the cost of doing busi-
ness with minors by absorbing the occasional voided contract, or settle suits
privately and avoid drawing attention to the infancy doctrine.146 All these
reasons for the lack of application of these statutes exemplify the very vul-
nerability of minors online that the infancy doctrine was intended to
address.
This Part proposes potential resolutions to the application of these stat-
utes in light of the increased vulnerability of children online. Section IV.A
suggests the potential for state legislatures to reformulate these statutes as
they apply to children’s online transactions. Section IV.B argues that, cur-
rently, a judicial resolution may be more effective and appropriate in pro-
tecting children online.
A. Legislative Potential
The most obvious remedy to state misrepresentation-of-age statutes
would be a legislative solution. Unlike common law jurisprudence, which is
malleable but slow to change, legislatures are poised to make policy choices,
which, in this case, would include analyzing normative questions at the in-
tersection of law and child psychology.147 In deciding what children are “ca-
pable of doing” and in determining the policy values inherent in children’s
legal competency, legislatures, unlike courts, can hold committee hearings,
receive testimony from psychologists and legal scholars, and have an over-
arching debate about the application of a statute.148 Thereby, the legislature
can thoughtfully examine whether children’s added vulnerability and the
ease of age misrepresentation online outweighs the policy behind the current
statutes in defending adults from the occasional child seeking to defraud
them.
This Section evaluates two potential legislative solutions: (1) a bright-
line rule that misrepresentation-of-age statutes apply to adolescents’ online
contracts but not to those of infants and (2) a rule-of-reason approach that
evaluates the context surrounding a child’s misrepresentation of his age and
whether OSPs have undertaken a sufficient inquiry to have reason to believe
the child’s representation that he was old enough to enter into the agree-
ment. It then concludes that there is insufficient legal or political momen-
tum for a legislative solution on the horizon.
The first proposal would be to create split misrepresentation-of-age stat-
utes that have separate standards for childhood (applying to children under
were being developed. With the recently changed legal landscape, the doctrine needs to be
reapplied rather than redefined.”).
146. Id. at 67–71.
147. See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 370–74 (arguing that “[t]he law of children is
particularly suited for resolution by legislatures” and proposing the development of a Model
Children’s Code).
148. Id. at 373.
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thirteen years of age) and adolescence. Such a resolution would allow legisla-
tures to balance the policy considerations behind the infancy doctrine with
the policy considerations behind the misrepresentation statutes149 by apply-
ing the misrepresentation statutes only to adolescents, who are at least more
literate and less impulsive than children.150
Redrafting misrepresentation statutes to presumptively not apply to pre-
adolescent online contracts would provide a clear signal that the legislature
wants the infancy doctrine to apply online and that its policy underpinnings
may outweigh the economic interests of e-businesses and website providers.
At the same time, by continuing to apply misrepresentation-of-age statutes
to adolescents, who are more likely to make (or are more responsible for)
knowledgeable misrepresentations of their age, the legislature would not
completely abandon the policy interests behind these statutes. Such an ap-
proach would also confer benefits of “certainty and administrative effi-
ciency”151 by allowing OSPs to structure their online transactions knowing
that reneging adolescents may be found responsible if they breach the terms.
But the common concern that bright-line rules result in “arbitrary line
drawing”152 may be especially resonant here. As discussed in Part II, our
understanding of children’s digital literacy is still evolving and there are far
more factors affecting children’s digital comprehension and decisionmaking
than print-based comprehension. Because this area is unresolved, it is diffi-
cult to validly propose an age at which society should expect adolescents to
sufficiently understand the potential implications of boilerplate and to be
held responsible for their online forays.
Alternatively, misrepresentation-of-age statutes could be amended to
specify or describe what, in the online context, would be considered a suffi-
cient inquiry into a user’s age by an OSP to give it “good reason to believe
the minor capable of contracting.”153 If state legislatures decided that brow-
sewrap or clickwrap terms of service with hidden age representations are
insufficient, then the statutes could be amended to require children to have
affirmatively stated their age. Depending on states’ evaluations of the com-
peting policy interests, states could then draft statutes so that any affirmative
misrepresentation precludes a child from disaffirming a contract or so that
there is a rebuttable presumption that the child or parent has been put on
notice of the legal significance of the agreement and so cannot disaffirm.
149. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum,
51 Hastings L.J. 1265, 1302–04 (2000) (arguing that adolescent contracts should be binding
because of the relative abilities of adolescents and the underlying accountability of contract
law).
150. For a proposal that the law should “distinguish between young children and ado-
lescents and operate under a system of rebuttable presumptions of capacity,” see Daniel, supra
note 2, at 267.
151. Slade, supra note 9, at 626.
152. Id.
153. Iowa Code § 599.3 (2011).
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When considering the inducement effect of online advertisements and
websites targeting children,154 however, even this proposal may be insuffi-
cient to fully embrace the traditional policy objective of protecting children
from companies that would take advantage of them in the marketplace.155
While the ease with which children can select the wrong date hardly seems
sufficient for OSPs to believe a user’s selected age, the current paucity of age-
verification technology limits the available options. Still, at least requiring an
affirmative misrepresentation of age would put children on notice that there
may be consequences or implications from using a false age.
A context-specific statute would likely also face resistance from OSPs,
who already tout the difficulty of truly determining the age of users.156 Such
statutes inherently lack the predictability of a bright-line legal rule and limit
the ability of companies to “know what the likely results are when they
transact with minors.”157 As a result, a context-specific statute would rely
significantly on judicial application to define the contours of what consti-
tutes a sufficient inquiry.
Nevertheless, while warranted, it is unlikely that a legislative solution
will be forthcoming. Although it is generally acknowledged that children are
vulnerable online, most policy and legislative attention has focused on ques-
tions of children’s privacy—in particular, on preventing websites from col-
lecting the personal information of children under thirteen years of age and
protecting children from sexual predators.158 Even this limited federal legis-
lation has resulted in protracted debate with strong voices on both sides and
the need for repeated rulemaking and comment periods with little resolu-
tion.159 At the same time, the paucity of recent infancy doctrine cases sug-
gests that there is little momentum to drive a review of misrepresentation-
of-age statutes.160 And the size and value of the internet market, generating
billions of dollars in revenue per year,161 make it unlikely that attempts to
154. See discussion supra Section II.B.
155. See Slade, supra note 9, at 614.
156. See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
157. Slade, supra note 9, at 626.
158. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2012) (reg-
ulating what information websites cannot obtain or track from children under thirteen).
159. See, e.g., Daniel Castro, Info. Tech. Innovation Found., Comments of the In-
formation Technology and Innovation Foundation in the Matter of Proposed Modifications to the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (2012), available at http://www2.itif.org/2012-ftc-
coppa-filing.pdf (arguing that creating more restrictions on the collection of information from
children hinders benefits from targeted advertising and limits the development of child-di-
rected websites); Sengupta, supra note 126 (discussing groups such as Consumers Union and
the Center for Digital Democracy, which call for restrictions on child-collected information,
and the institution of parental safeguards, which would allow monitoring of children’s infor-
mation online).
160. Cf. Preston & Crowther, supra note 12, at 67–70, 77 (noting that, in the last ten
years, there have been only 128 reported cases addressing the infancy doctrine because the
doctrine is not well known and because cases frequently settle but predicting that if awareness
of the doctrine became more widespread, suits may arise and serve as a deterrent).
161. See Interactive Advertising Bureau, supra note 87, at 12.
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amend or rescind these statutes as they apply to online contracts would re-
ceive substantial political or business support.
B. Judicial Proposal
Consequently, especially in the short term,162 it is likely that the judici-
ary must conduct any reinterpretation of misrepresentation-of-age statutes.
The obsolescence of misrepresentation-of-age statutes and the lack of juris-
prudence applying them163 begs for the modern judiciary to reinterpret and
reapply them in the online context.164
The most common formulation of misrepresentation-of-age statutes
prevents disaffirmance where the other party believed the minor capable of
contracting “on account of the minor’s own misrepresentations as to his
majority.”165 It is a canon of statutory interpretation that “[w]ords that are
not terms of art and that are not statutorily defined are customarily given
their ordinary meanings, often derived from the dictionary.”166 The ordinary
meaning of “misrepresentation” is the making of a “false or misleading rep-
resentation . . . usually with an intent to deceive or be unfair.”167 The statu-
tory text thus allows for judges to assess the extent to which a child had the
requisite intent. And judges may require a showing that a child made an
“affirmative or definite statement intended to mislead.”168
Judges should, therefore, conduct a factual analysis into whether a child
may have been induced to enter into an agreement by advertisements or
websites targeting children, as well as the extent of the child’s knowledge or
understanding that he was forming a contract and lying about his age to do
so. For example, a judge may find that a child who knowingly says that he is
eighteen to create an online account was sufficiently knowledgeable and
willful about the fact so as to disallow disaffirmance; in another instance,
162. As discussed, understanding of children’s digital literacy is still in its early stages,
see supra Section II.A, and technology allowing for easy identification of users’ ages is still very
developmental, see supra Section III.B.1.
163. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
164. Insofar as old cases applying the statutes adopted a low standard for minors to
misrepresent their ages, judges need not act similarly with online contracts. Cf. Timothy
Schwarz, Comment, Cases Time Forgot: Why Judges Can Sometimes Ignore Controlling Prece-
dent, 56 Emory L.J. 1475, 1475–76 (2007) (arguing that ignoring precedent is a normal tech-
nique used by judges when the precedent gives different weight to values, so later courts can
ignore the implicit rule of law without overruling the precedent).
165. E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-3 (LexisNexis 2009).
166. Yule Kim, Cong. Research Serv., Order Code 97-589, Statutory Interpreta-
tion: General Principles and Recent Trends 6 (2008).
167. Misrepresent, Merriam–Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
misrepresent (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
168. Friar v. Rae-Chandler Co., 185 N.W. 32, 34 (Iowa 1921).
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however, a judge may find that a child who simply provided his email ad-
dress to create an account or played online games was unaware that, in do-
ing so, he had represented that he was eighteen and so lacked the requisite
intent to deceive.169
Since the plain text of the statute affords judges the opportunity to un-
dertake a fact-heavy inquiry into whether a child misrepresented his age,
courts will be able to examine and hear expert testimony regarding a num-
ber of matters: the child’s history and experience online, the involvement
and supervision of parents, the benefits provided by the OSP, the appear-
ance of the website, the availability and presentation of the terms of service,
and whether the website required the child to affirmatively state his age. One
of the potential determining factors may be whether the child merely “ac-
cepted” a clickwrap or browsewrap agreement, as opposed to creating an
account or entering into an e-commerce agreement that required him to
actively select and purchase goods online.
Misrepresentation statutes also require that “the other party had good
reason to believe the minor capable of contracting.”170 This demands that
judges evaluate the circumstances surrounding a contract’s formation and
any indications that a child may have made to justify the other party’s belief
that the minor was capable of contracting.171 Historically, judges relied heav-
ily on a combination of a child’s written or oral representations of his age, as
well as whether a child visually appeared to be old enough to contract.172 In
one case, the failure of a party to make any inquiry into a child’s age was
169. Of course, children’s ability to create an email account to begin with may be lim-
ited by their age; however, an analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this Note.
170. E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-3.
171. First Nat’l Bank of Titonka v. Casey, 138 N.W. 897, 899 (Iowa 1912) (“[W]hether
there was ‘good reason to believe’ [a] minor [was] capable of contracting necessarily must
depend on the circumstances of each particular case.”); Thosath v. Transp. Motor Co., 240 P.
921, 921 (Wash. 1925) (“[I]n order to determine whether defendant’s agent had good reasons
. . . you should also take into consideration the appearance of the minor at the time of entering
into the contract, and any and all other circumstances which surrounded the making of the
contract at the time in question . . . .” (quoting jury instruction) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
172. See, e.g., Homan v. Comstock, 289 P.2d 362, 362 (Wash. 1955) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that the sellers of real property were justified in believing a minor to be of age when he
represented that he was twenty-seven years old and was “a large, mature appearing young
man” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lubin v. Cowell, 170 P.2d 301, 308 (Wash. 1946)
(refusing to allow disaffirmance where the child appeared to be twenty-five to twenty-six years
old, did not advise the other party he was a minor, and certified that he was over twenty-one
years old); Stone v. Knutzen, 265 P. 161, 161–62 (Wash. 1928) (upholding a trial court’s
conclusion that there was a justified reason to believe a child capable of contracting because
the “trial court saw the appellant and was in far better position to state whether or not his
representations as to his age, taken in conjunction with his appearance generally, were calcu-
lated to induce in the mind of the respondent the belief that [the child] was capable of
contracting”).
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insufficient to prevent disaffirmance where the child did not realize that he
was making a representation of his age.173
Based on the lackluster and ineffective age verification measures taken
by OSPs,174 judges could easily find that an OSP did not have a “good rea-
son” to believe that the other party was capable of contracting. The judicial
inquiry is, however, inevitably complicated by the difficulty in visually eval-
uating a party’s age online. If a court interprets “good reason” too strictly,
then there is the risk that it would be impossible for companies to enter into
agreements with children online that are not at risk of disaffirmance, regard-
less of the intent behind a child’s misrepresentation. While a judge must
plainly apply the statute, context and purpose must guide statutory mean-
ing.175 It would, therefore, be inapposite to adopt an application that com-
pletely ignores the statute’s stated policy interest in protecting adults who
unwittingly enter into contracts with children.
Consider the two forms of online agreements emphasized in this Note:
browsewrap and clickwrap agreements. It would not seem unreasonable for
a judge to uniformly hold that an OSP is not justified in relying on age
representations tucked away in the fine print of browsewrap agreements. In
a browsewrap agreement, not only is there no inquiry by the OSP as to
whether the child’s age is as “represented” in the agreement but there is also
no affirmative statement by a child of his age; in fact, the child is likely
entirely unaware that, in browsing the website, he made a representation of
his age. In this scenario, the child is most vulnerable to the unsuspecting
imposition of oppressive contract terms and the OSP most predisposed, as
evidenced by its use of hidden age representations in passive agreements, to
exploit this vulnerability.
The application to clickwrap agreements would likely be more fact spe-
cific. Clickwrap agreements require a child to affirmatively accept a website’s
terms of service, so OSPs are more justified in relying on an agreement’s
acceptance as an indication that the party can contract. Judges would be apt,
however, to evaluate the appearance and interface of the website. If a website
specifically targets children (through advertisements, audiovisual cues
shown to attract children, or child-friendly content) or is popular with chil-
dren (such as social media websites), then judges may be less inclined to find
an OSP justified in relying on a child’s acceptance of the clickwrap terms.
Judges could also distinguish between clickwrap agreements that make age a
threshold question—by requiring users to first enter their age or agree that
they are over the age of eighteen before subsequently accepting the actual
terms—and those that simply offer “I accept” boxes and hide the age repre-
sentation in the hyperlinked terms of service.
173. Friar, 185 N.W. at 34 (concluding that there was no good reason for a party to rely
on a child saying that he had money in the bank for the purpose of buying a car because no
questions were asked about the child’s age, and the child did not think that he was making a
representation of his age).
174. See discussion supra Section III.A.
175. Kim, supra note 166, at 6–7.
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As with any judicial resolution, the potential for such a fact-intensive,
case-by-case inquiry could increase the judicial workload.176 Additionally,
there is no guarantee that it would resolve the uncertainty about the applica-
tion of misrepresentation-of-age statutes online because “a minor’s rights
and responsibilities are subject to the whims and assumptions of the partic-
ular factfinder who is assigned the minor’s case.”177 Nonetheless, such a so-
lution at least provides children with the opportunity to be protected by the
infancy doctrine in spite of misrepresentation-of-age statutes.
Conclusion
Misrepresentation-of-age statutes are an outdated vestige of the classical
contract era. They have no place in the digital world where OSPs actively
target children as consumers and have no incentive to avoid contracting with
them. The difficulties in determining age over the internet emphasize the
mismatch between misrepresentation-of-age statutes and the modern reality
of digital contracts. However, these difficulties do not warrant giving OSPs a
blanket ability to enforce hidden terms on unwitting children. Rather, the
greater bargaining power and financial benefits that OSPs derive from chil-
dren’s participation in the online community underscore the need for a doc-
trine that continues to protect children. Although legislative solutions exist,
they are unlikely to be forthcoming. The optimal solution, therefore, would
be for judges to reinterpret misrepresentation-of-age statutes in the digital
context. Judges are well positioned to apply the language of these statutes to
online contracts in a manner that considers the heightened vulnerability of
children online to oppressive contract terms, inadvertent age misrepresenta-
tions, and targeted advertisements.
176. See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 368.
177. Id.
